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An Analysis of Counternarcotics
Strategies in Colombia1
Jonathan D. Rosen, FIU
Bruce M. Bagley, University of Miami

Abstract
This article examines Plan Colombia, which began as
a counternarcotics program in 2000. The U.S. has allocated more than $8 billion to the country via Plan Colombia from 2000 to 2012. The article examines some
of the successes of Plan Colombia. Some experts and
policymakers have touted Plan Colombia as a model
for other countries facing problems with drug trafficking, organized crime, and insurgency. This work
focuses on the lessons learned from Plan Colombia
and provides a critical perspective of the concept of
models
Drug trafficking and organized crime continue to be
important issues on the U.S. security agenda. Colombia has been at the epicenter of the U.S.-led war on
drugs for decades. Colombian President Juan Manuel
Santos (2010-2018) traveled to Washington, D.C. on
February 4, 2016 to visit President Barack Obama and
celebrate 15 years of Plan Colombia, which began as
a counternarcotics plan.2 Juan Carlos Pinzón, Colombia’s ambassador to the United States, has also been
promoting strengthening cooperation between the
U.S. and Colombia. Plan Colombia has been touted
as a model for other countries suffering as a result of
drug trafficking and organized crime as well as insurgency movements. This article is an effort to analyze
the concept of Plan Colombia as a model for other
countries, particularly after the U.S. has provided Colombia with $10 billion in assistance over the past 15
years.3

Historical Background
By the end of the 1990s, Colombia faced major economic challenges as well as high levels of insecurity
in the country. Colombia is a complex country because in addition to drug traffickers the country has
had more than 50 years of internal armed conflict
as various guerrilla organizations exist in Colombia.

The largest guerrilla organization is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia—FARC). The FARC
participate in various illicit activities such as drug
trafficking, organized crime, extortion, and kidnapping. President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) sought
support from the U.S. to prevent the situation in Colombia from worsening. Pastrana desired to end the
internal armed conflict and focus first on peace and
developmental issues and then drug trafficking and
organized crime. The Clinton administration changed
the initial plan, focusing more on drug trafficking and
organized crime as it did not want to draw the U.S.
into Colombia’s internal armed conflict. While President Pastrana envisioned a plan financed by the international community, European governments did
not agree with the reversal of the formula by the Clinton administration. As a result, Plan Colombia was financed solely by the U.S. In 2000, the U.S. Congress
passed Plan Colombia and the Clinton administration
signed it into law.4 Plan Colombia focused on “hard”
components such as strengthening the military and
combating coca cultivation as opposed to alternative
development. The original goal of Plan Colombia was
to reduce drug cultivation, processing, and trafficking
by 50 percent in the first six years of the initiative.5
According to Adam Isacson, from 2000 to 2016, 71
percent of the financial resources went towards the
police and military assistance, while only 29 percent
went towards institutional an economic assistance.6

Shifts in the Goals of Plan Colombia
The goals of Plan Colombia evolved over time. The
events of September 11, 2001 altered U.S. foreign
policy as the Bush administration launched a global
war on terror. President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) recognized that he had to change the perceptions of the
Colombian conflict in order to fit within the broader
foreign policy goals of the U.S. President Uribe argued that Colombia did not have an internal armed
conflict but rather terrorists. He contended that the
FARC in Colombia are narco-terrorists or narco-guerrillas. President Bush bought into the re-orientation of
Plan Colombia and provided the Uribe administration
with the financial support necessary. The Bush administration supported Colombia in its fight against
the narco-terrorists for several reasons. First, Colombia has historically been a key ally of the U.S. Second, the Bush administration received criticism that
it was at war against the Muslim world. Supporting
the Colombian government enabled President Bush
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to demonstrate that it helped governments combat
terrorism around the globe, regardless of religion or
geographic region. Third, Colombia is located in an
important position and an unstable Colombia could
impact U.S. security as well as regional security.7

In addition to being the number one coca cultivating
country, cocaine production has continued in Colombia. In 2008, Colombia’s potential manufacturing
capability of cocaine was 450 tons. While the manufacturing of cocaine declined slightly over the years,
cocaine production has remained high: 410 tons in
The FARC concerned the Uribe administration as this
2009; 350 tons in 2010; 345 tons in 2011; and 309 tons
guerrilla group dominated large parts of rural Colomin 2012.18 The results of the partial successes of Plan
bia. Uribe sought to combat this guerrilla organiza- Colombia are that drug routes have shifted to other
tion and prevent them from expanding. In the early countries like Mexico.19 However, routes are returning
2000s, there were discussions among experts about to Colombia. Thus, despite these partial victories,20
Colombia being on the brink of becoming a failed the overall situation has not changed as drugs remain
state.8 Support from the U.S. enabled the Colombian purer, cheaper, and more readily available than when
government to modernize and professionalize the
the U.S. launched the war on drugs in 1971.21
Colombian Army. As a result, the Uribe administration dealt crushing blows to the FARC, which was in Plan Mexico and the Concept of a Model
part due to the military training and support that the
As a result of the successes, Plan Colombia has been
U.S. government provided the Colombian military. By
promoted as a model for other countries suffering
2000, the FARC had approximately 20,000 members.9
The number of FARC members decreased to 8,000 in from organized crime, drug trafficking, and guerilla
groups. Mexican President Felipe Calderón (20062010 from 16,000 in 2002.10
2012) sought support from the U.S. to combat drug
11
Plan Colombia had “partial victories,” as security lev- trafficking organizations. The Bush administration
els improved over time and the state’s control of the supported the Mexican government with a Plan Mexcountry’s territory increased. In 2005, Colombia had ico. The name of the Plan eventually changed to the
801 recorded kidnappings. The number of kidnap- Mérida Initiative in order to disassociate it from Plan
pings decreased from 523 in 2007 to 213 in 2009.12 Colombia.22 While there are differences between the
In 2014, Colombia recorded 288 kidnappings. In ad- Mérida Initiative and Plan Colombia, the overall stratdition to decreases in the number of kidnappings, egies have similarities. Both initiatives have focused
Colombia also witnessed a decline in homicides. In on “hard” components and combating drug traffick2005, for example, Colombia had a national homicide ing and organized crime, particularly by using the
rate of 42.2 per 100,000 inhabitants. By 2014, the ho- military. Calderón militarized the drug war in Mexico
micide rate decreased to 28.0 per 100,000.13 In sum, in part because he did not have high levels of confiColombia saw increases in security according to vari- dence in the police as a result of the high levels of corous metrics.14
ruption.23 The result has been extreme levels of violence. During the Calderón presidency, 70,000 people
Plan Colombia, however, was less successful in terms
died as a result of drug-related violence and another
of reducing drug trafficking and organized crime.
26,000 disappeared.24 The goals of the Mérida InitiaAerial eradication has been a major element of Plan tive have been altered under the Obama administraColombia. The spraying of herbicides has had en- tion as efforts have been made to focus more on the
vironmental and health consequences. In addition rule of law and strengthening institutions. Despite
to the negative ramifications of aerial spraying prothis shift, Mérida Initiative funding levels have been
grams, such efforts have not been effective as coca lower than Plan Colombia: $143 million in FY 2011 to
cultivation has simply shifted between departments $194.2 million in FY 2014.25
of Colombia and to other countries in the Andes. In
December 2007, Colombia cultivated 98,899 hectares There have also been talks about a Plan Colombia
of coca. The number of hectares declined to 63,762 for Central America,26 particularly since this region
and 47,790 in December 2011 and December 2012, has become extremely violent in large part due to
respectively.15 Peru became the leading coca cultivat- drug trafficking and organized crime. In 2012, Honing country in the world in 2013.16 In 2015, Colombia duras recorded 85.5 homicides per 100,000 people,
regained its status as the leading coca cultivator in making it the most violent non-warring country in
the world.17
the world.27 In 2015, El Salvador surpassed Honduras
as the most violent non-warring country.28 Retired
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Admiral James Stavridis, who led the U.S. Southern
Command in Miami from 2006-2009,29 advocated
for a Plan Colombia for Central America. He argues,
“We need a ‘Plan Central America,’ much as we had a
‘Plan Colombia,’ and now is the time to explore what
that should look like.”30 Yet some experts have questioned a Plan Colombia for Central America. Michael
Lohmuller contends, “Ultimately, while it is right to
appeal for increased US attention to a region plagued
by violence and crime, Central America is not Colombia. Policymakers must therefore be cautious about
using Plan Colombia as a road map for action in the
region, and should avoid indiscriminately taking its
lessons as gospel.”31
Plan Colombia has not only been advocated as a model for countries in Latin America but other countries
around the world. It has been argued that Afghanistan could learn from the lessons of Plan Colombia.32
General Peter Pace, for instance, maintains that “the
model that is present here in Colombia where the
Armed Forces of the country have rid certain areas
of terrorists and then, very importantly, the government has followed with projects that have brought
electricity and water and jobs.”33 Despite the occupation of the country by U.S. troops for more than a
decade, Afghanistan remains the leading producer of
opium poppy, which is the key ingredient for heroin.
In 2012, Afghanistan produced 95 percent of the opium world-wide.34
Such discussions are despite the fact that many critics
have argued that Plan Colombia has not been successful on the drug front. Plan Colombia has focused
on supply-side strategies as opposed to addressing
various underlying issues. Plan Colombia was originally designed as a counternarcotics program, and
the results have been underwhelming. The problem
with supply-side strategies is that they fail to address
the demand for drugs. The logic is that criminal organizations and guerilla groups will continue to traffic
drugs—and other illicit commodities—as long as a
market exists.

Plan Colombia do not help strengthen weak institutions within Colombia. More resources could be allocated to helping the Colombian government—and
other governments—reform its institutions. Major
institutional reforms are needed in Colombia—and
other countries—in order to consolidate democracy.
Strengthening institutions will help combat the
number of human rights abuses that have occurred
in countries like Colombia and Mexico.35 In 2008,
there were over 800,000 individuals who had been
victimized in Colombia, demonstrating that human
rights abuses continue to be a serious issue.36 Certain
groups have been vulnerable, particularly various
indigenous communities and Afro-Colombians. Colombia has seen more than 5.7 million people who
have been internally displaced since June 2014.37 Colombian soldiers have also been involved in what is
known as the false positives scandal where they killed
civilians and dressed them in FARC uniforms in order
to receive rewards. José Miguel Vivanco claims that
“[f ]alse positive killings amount to one of the worst
episodes of mass atrocity in the Western Hemisphere
in recent years, and there is mounting evidence that
many senior army officers bear responsibility.”38 While
Plan Colombia is not responsible for all human rights
abuses in Colombia as the country has an internal
armed conflict, the argument is that the militarization of the strategy has contributed to human rights
abuses.39 Sweeping assaults on Afro-Colombian and
indigenous communities and the disregard for human rights during the Uribe administration suggests
that the price of professionalization of the Colombian
military was quite high.

A model like Plan Colombia is also problematic because it does not provide sufficient resources for
addressing development issues. Unemployment, inequality, and lack of opportunities are contributing
factors to drug trafficking and organized crime. The
problem of the ninis—youth who ni estudian ni trabajan (neither work nor study)—has become a major
issue in many Latin American countries, not just Colombia.40 A model that seeks to focus on combating
Another issue with Plan Colombia has been the failure the supply of drugs fails to address the socioeconomto address other important problems. Plan Colombia ic challenges. Coca cultivation remains a major issue
focused the bulk of the resources on strengthening in Colombia because campesinos do not have other
the military and combating the guerrilla organiza- viable options as other products do not grow in the
tions as well as drug trafficking. However, this Plan jungle or the Andes Mountains.41 In addition, peasant
did not provide sufficient funding to combat corrup- farmers can earn more for growing coca than other
tion and impunity. Colombia—as well as Mexico and products, which helps explain why they resort to culCentral American countries—has very high levels of tivating coca.
corruption and impunity. The military components of
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Conclusion
Drug trafficking, organized crime, and guerrilla movements as well as other forms of insurgency will continue to be key priorities on the U.S. national security
agenda. Debates have existed among academics and
policy analysts as to how successful Plan Colombia
has been. While some analysts have argued that Plan
Colombia has been very successful as security has
increased in Colombia,42 others have questioned the
accomplishments of this Plan. Adam Isacson asserts
that “[w]ords like ‘success’ and ‘model’ are unhelpful
to understanding Colombia’s experience. It has come
with too many scandals, abuses, disappointments
and high costs to be considered a template for other
troubled states receiving U.S. assistance, like Mexico
or Afghanistan.”43 Some individuals, like Isacson, have
argued that the security gains of Plan Colombia could
be reversed and question whether Colombia is safer
today.44 There are still other internal armed actors in
Colombia and human rights abuses continue to be a
major concern, particularly among certain sectors of
the population such as Afro-Colombians, labor organizations, and various indigenous groups.
Models like Plan Colombia that focus on “hard” components fail to address the various underlying challenges such as corruption, impunity, and weak institutions. In addition, some experts have argued that
Plan Colombia has not been successful in terms of
drugs as coca cultivation and drug production have
continued. In sum, Plan Colombia shows that there
are key lessons for policy-makers with regard to what
has worked and what has not worked in efforts to
combat drug trafficking as well as guerilla organizations.45 It is important to note that each country is different, and a general model does not take into consideration the nuances of each country.
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